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Abstract
A rich theoretical literature discusses whether replacing tariffs with value added tax
(VAT) improves efficiency. We provide empirical evidence on a novel complementarity
between VAT and trade taxes. Downstream domestic firms require VAT receipts from
importers to claim purchases VAT increasing incentives for honest reporting of imports.
We use the trade gap, the difference between mirror and domestic trade reports in Iran at
6-digit HS disaggregation, to measure this complementarity. Iran introduced VAT in 2008
and increased its rate from 3 to 9 percent since then. Difference-in-differences estimations
show that a 1 percentage point increase in the VAT rate reduces the trade gap by 6.7
percent. Consistent with the compliance mechanisms of VAT, we observe a smaller effect
for the consumer products that have a shorter value chain. Our results suggest that
replacing tariffs with VAT results in a double dividend. Tax revenue could increase due
to better tariff compliance and a broader VAT base.
Keywords: Value Added Tax, Trade Liberalization, Tariffs, Chains Effect, Tax Com-
pliance
JEL Classification codes: H26, F13, F14
1 Introduction
Developing countries raise a small amount of tax revenue due to low state capacity and high
informality. They also rely on highly distortionary but easier to enforce tax instruments such
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as tariffs and corporate taxes. The advent of value added tax (VAT) and its adoption in many
developing countries changed this pattern. VAT provided an avenue for revenue neutral tax
reforms that improve efficiency in developing countries. Besides, VAT is collected along the
production chain often with an invoice-credit system which creates opposite evasion incentives
for the two sides of a transaction. It also leaves a paper trail along the production chain which
enables tax authorities to cross check tax reports. The invoice credit system also withholds
taxes at upstream firms which creates an incentive for honest reporting (Keen (2008); Waseem
(2020b)). Given the enforcement properties of VAT, a reform package that replaces tariffs
with VAT could maintain tax revenue and improve economic efficiency.
The theoretical literature on the effectiveness of a joint tariff and VAT reform is inconclusive.
Keen and Ligthart (2002) argue that the broad base of VAT allows for a smaller increase in
VAT rate to offset a reduction in tariffs which creates further efficiency gains. Besides, in
a destination-based system, VAT is imposed on imports and the informal firms purchasing
from formal ones would receive a non-refundable VAT burden (Keen (2008)). This mechanism
provides a more efficient burden on the informal sector compared to the de facto burden of
tariffs discussed by many scholars, including Emran and Stiglitz (2005). An under investigated
aspect of a joint tariff and VAT reform is the bilateral spillovers. Formal firms purchasing from
importers would require VAT receipts to reclaim purchases VAT. They would also need valid
receipts to claim expenses for corporate tax purposes. This creates a backward linkage that
incentivizes importers to truthfully report imports (De Paula and Scheinkman (2010)). There-
fore, the introduction of VAT is expected to reduce trade tax evasion and hence improve the
collection efficiency of trade taxes. This suggests that tariffs and VAT could be complementary
instruments in improving economic efficiency and raising tax revenue.
In this paper, we study the complementary relation between tariffs and VAT in Iran. Specif-
ically we aim to measure the impact of a VAT rate increase on trade evasion. The empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of a joint tariff and VAT reform is sparse. In one of the few
empirical studies, Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) show that tax revenue losses due to trade
liberalization are offset by domestic taxes like VAT for middle and high-income countries but
not for poor countries. We did not find any studies on the complementarity between tariffs
and VAT. Empirical evaluation of this complementarity is impossible under a joint reform
because a uniform tariff reduction also affects trade evasion (Fisman and Wei (2004)). In our
context, the government introduced VAT in 2008 without any significant trade liberalization.
Many product codes were exempted from VAT, creating a natural control group. Initially the
VAT rate was 3 percent and then gradually increased to 9 percent. At the same time, the
government has been continuously changing tariffs before and after the introduction of VAT
at individual product categories. Therefore, we have an ideal setting to separate the impact
of tariffs and VAT on trade evasion.
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To construct a measure of trade evasion, we subtract reported exports to Iran by the World
Integrated Trade System (mirror reports) from reported imports by Iran Customs Agency at
the Harmonic System (HS) 6-digit level. This is called the trade gap in the literature (Fisman
and Wei (2004)). We employ a difference-in-differences strategy and control for HS6 product
and year fixed effects to estimate the impact of VAT on the trade gap. The quasi-random
variation created by the introduction and changes of VAT on a subset of HS6 codes allows us
to compare the evolution of the trade gap for VATable products to others over 2005 - 2016.
The identification assumption is that in the absence of VAT, the evolution of the trade gap
for the two groups would be identical.
Our results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the VAT rate reduces trade gap by
6.7 percent. This estimated elasticity is robust to multiple tests such as controlling for mean
reversion, and exclusion of sanction years. VAT chain effects are stronger for longer value
chains. Consumer goods have shorter value chains compared to non-consumer ones (e.g. raw,
intermediary, and capital goods1). Therefore, we expect a weaker impact of VAT on consumer
goods. Our results corroborate this conjecture. A one percentage point increase in the VAT
rate reduces trade gap by 2.6 percent for consumer goods. But for non-consumer goods this
effect is 7.4 percent. Finally, we observe an interesting non-linearity for this complementarity.
For products with a larger initial trade gap, the VAT is more effective in reducing the trade
gap. Interpreting the initial trade gap as a measure of informality for a given product, we can
claim that VAT has a stronger effect for products with higher degrees of informality.
Our paper makes four contributions. First, we provide evidence on a novel complementary
mechanism that links VAT and trade taxes. Studying the inter-relation of taxes is rare in the
literature and involves real empirical challenges. The richness of our context allows us to iden-
tify this complementarity. Second, there is a nascent literature that studies the impact of VAT
on tax evasion. Most of these studies rely on independent audits and experimental variation
to tease out evasion responses (e.g. Pomeranz (2015); Carrillo et al. (2017)). These studies
often require mobilization of significant resources and are hard to conduct. The existence of
mirror reports for trade flows allow us to easily construct evasion proxies. Therefore, we are
able to add empirical support to the idea that VAT can reduce tax evasion but from a novel
angle, i.e. its impact on trade tax evasion. Third, we shed light on the significance of VAT
chain effects by looking at products with shorter and longer value chains. Finally, we provide
suggestive evidence that VAT is even more effective for product codes that have higher initial
informality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly discuss the relevant literature.
Section 3 provides a short description of the Iranian context. Section 4 describes our data.
1The categorization of consumption, raw, intermediary, and capital goods, is referred to as the Broad
Economic Classification (BEC).
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Section 5 presents the estimation strategy. Section 6 discusses the results and a final section
concludes.
2 Literature
Our work relates to three branches of the literature. First, the theoretical literature that
discusses the pros and cons of a joint tariff and VAT reform. Keen and Ligthart (2002) argue
that VAT is more efficient because it has a broad base and unlike trade taxes does not distort
trade flows. In contrast, Emran and Stiglitz (2005) claim that the presence of a large informal
sector erodes the revenue gains of VAT. Therefore the results derived in the earlier literature
are “unhelpful at best and potentially misleading as the basis of indirect tax policy reform
in developing countries”. This argument relies on the fact that tariffs are better suited for
imposing a de facto burden on the informal firms. Emran and Stiglitz (2005) ignore the
fact that VAT is also levied at the port of imports making it almost similar to tariffs from
the perspective of the informal sector (Keen (2008)). Davies and Paz (2011) use simulation
method with a model of heterogeneous firms to show that VAT does not necessarily expand the
informal sector but tariff reduction reduces the informal sector. To summarize, the theoretical
debate is inconclusive as there are special cases under which the joint tariff and VAT reform
is not welfare improving.
The second literature which relates to our study is the empirical literature on the intersection
of tariffs and VAT. This part of the literature is surprisingly thin. Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)
is the only study that looks at the impact of domestic tax reforms in offsetting tariff revenue
losses after trade liberalization. Their findings show that poor countries are unable to recoup
the lost revenue while the rich countries actually improve revenue after trade liberalization. For
middle income countries there does not seem to be a decrease in revenue after tariff reduction.
The empirical literature provides no guidance on the potential mechanisms that might become
operative under a joint reform. This is where our paper fits in. We provide evidence on the
complementary effect of VAT on trade evasion. We empirically quantify the role of VAT in
reducing trade evasion and hence improving the collection efficiency of tariffs.
The third literature related to our study is the growing literature on the enforcement properties
of VAT. We contribute to this literature by looking at the spillover of VAT on trade taxes.
This literature identifies three mechanisms that improve the enforcement properties of VAT
(Keen and Lockwood (2010); De Paula and Scheinkman (2011, 2010)). First, VAT is collected
through the production chain. Receipts from seller and purchaser of a product could be cross-
checked. These receipt leaves a paper trail for tax agencies that reduces fraud. Second, VAT
creates opposite incentives for the two sides of a transaction which reduces the likelihood of
collusion. Third, purchases VAT is effectively withheld at the upstream firm. Even if the
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downstream firm evades VAT, it bears some of the VAT burden on purchases. The literature
has shown that the proper operation of these mechanisms relies on the extent of the informal
sector (De Paula and Scheinkman (2011, 2010). Recently, a series of well-identified empirical
studies have shown that VAT chain effects and mechanisms are quite strong in improving
compliance. For example, Pomeranz (2015) reports on an audit experiment in Chile and shows
firms subject to the VAT paper trail respond less to additional audit threats. Waseem (2020b)
provides strong evidence in support of the withholding effect of VAT from Pakistan. Hoseini
and Briand (2020) also report on the importance of chain effects in the Indian context and
show forward and backward linkages matter for the efficiency gain of replacing sales taxes with
VAT. Li and Wang (2020) use the expansion of VAT in China to show better compliance with
VAT than a turnover tax, especially for B2B transactions. Finally, Waseem (2020a) report
on extensive VAT evasion in Pakistan which is weaker for upstream stages of the production
chain. Our paper also contributes to the VAT literature by looking at the compliance effect
of VAT on trade taxes.
3 Context
The Iranian tax system features five main instruments: corporate income tax, personal income
taxes, consumption taxes, import taxes, and wealth taxes. Iran does not have a comprehensive
personal income tax system and treats various sources of income separately. The tax law has
been reformed several times during the past four decades with little impact on the government
tax revenue. Iran collects a very small share of GDP in taxes compared to other developing
countries. Figure 1 shows that tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in Iran never exceeds 10
percent. If anything there is a gentle declining trend over time. The figure also shows the
share of tax revenue from consumption and import taxes. Consumption taxes include sales
taxes, excise taxes, and VAT. In 2008 the sales tax was replaced by VAT. However other excise
taxes are available both before and after 2008. Prior to 2008 consumption taxes had a share
of between 5 to 22 percent of total tax revenue. But after the introduction of VAT, we see
a peculiar increase in the share of consumption taxes. After 2012, consumption taxes raise
a higher share of revenue relative to import taxes. The reform seems to have a small effect
on total tax revenue as tax to GDP increases from around 6 percent to 7 percent. But the
importance of import taxes has declined around the time VAT introduction.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of maximum statutory VAT rate and its mean over the sample
period. In mid-2008 the government introduced VAT with a 3 percent rate2. In the three
following years, the rate stayed at 3 percent and then it saw one or two percentage point
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Figure 1: Tax to GDP and share of consumption and import taxes in tax revenue
Notes: Solid black line shows tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) over 1971 - 2016. The
vertical axis for this series is the left axis. The gray solid line shows the share of import tax revenue in total tax revenue.
The dashed gray line shows share of consumption tax revenue in total tax revenue. Both these series are show on the right
vertical axis. The red line shows introduction of VAT in 2008. The tax revenue figures include only central government
levies. Source: Tax data is from Iran National Tax Administration and GDP figures are from the Central Bank of Iran.
increases in the following years. The figure also shows mean statutory VAT rate which is
always below the maximum, because many products are either exempt or zero-rated. VAT
exemption means that product is outside the VAT net. Therefore, producers of that product
cannot reclaim any purchases VAT paid on their inputs and bear some burden of VAT. Zero-
rated products are eligible for VAT and hence their producers can reclaim any VAT paid on
inputs while they do not pay VAT on their sales. Thus, zero-rated producers receive no burden
of VAT. This distinction was not well understood in Iran and the VAT law passed in 2008
effectively leaves zero-rating only for exports. Since we focus on imports, zero-rating does not
apply to any of our goods. We only have VATable products that are subject to the statutory
VAT rate or non-VATable products that are exempt from VAT. This translates to a zero tax
rate at the port of imports and no outstanding purchases VAT for the downstream firms.
Finally, Iran’s VAT does not have a registration threshold3.
3During the implementation of VAT, Iran Tax Administration issued notices between 2008 to 2015 which
called firms in specific sectors or above specific turnover thresholds for VAT registration. By 2015 all firms
were called to register. This procedure is not reflected in our dataset because notices cannot be mapped to
HS6 product codes. Furthermore, the import VAT, which is the topic of this study, was enforced from the first
day.
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Figure 2: Evolution of max and mean statutory VAT rates
Notes: Solid black line shows maximum applicable VAT rate in the given year. VAT was introduced in mid-2008 and
hence the reported maximum rate is half of the maximum rate. Black dashed line with hollow markers shows mean
statutory VAT rate for each year. The mean rate is the simple mean of VAT rates for HS6 codes available in our data
in each year.
4 Data
Our data comes from three different sources. First, we use Iran Customs Administration (ICA)
reported imports and collected tariffs at 8-digit harmonized system classification (HS8). We
merge this data with the world’s reported exports to Iran from the World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS) database at 6-digit HS codes (HS6). Finally, statutory tariffs and VAT rates
at HS8 disaggregation are taken from the Handbook of Customs Regulations (also known as
Iran Imports and Exports Tariff Book), published annually by the Ministry of Industry, Mine
and Trade.
Since WITS data is at HS6 level we collapse the two other sources to this level. We trim the
data by excluding observations with trade values below the 1st and above the 99th percentile
of its distribution in each year.. Besides, observations with negative tariff rates are excluded as
data errors. The final cleaned dataset contains 37,456 observations from 2005 to 2016. For the
purpose of aggregation and merging, the VAT and tariff rates are simply averaged for HS8 codes
inside a given HS6 code4. The trade gap is calculated as the difference between the log of world
reported exports to Iran and the log of reported imports by ICA: Trade Gap:= ln(exportit)−
4In 2012, following the UN sanctions and economic downturn in Iran, the government introduced priorities
in order to manage the foreign currency quota for the import of goods within each priority. Besides, the
so called luxury products categorized as priority 10 and their statutory tariffs folded by two. We consider
priorities in the cleaned dataset.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
No. obs. Mean Median
Standard Deviation
Overall Within Between
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exports to Iran ($, WITS) 37,456 8,113,167 1,586,263 36,628,383 29,048,142 30,449,418
Imports ($, ICA) 37,456 4,119,427 1,065,818 7,302,459 3,707,549 6,952,125
VAT Rate (%) 37,456 2.94 1.50 3.30 2.75 2.10
VAT dummy 37,456 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.37 0.37
Statutory Tariff Rate (%) 36,891 21.34 12.00 23.66 9.45 28.92
Trade gap 37,456 0.31 0.23 2.12 1.50 1.97
Tariff Gap (%) 36,891 4.93 0.29 14.12 10.12 15.91
Notes: Table shows summary statistics of variables reported in the rows. Column (1) reports number of non-missing
observations. Column (2) reports mean of the variable. Column (3) shows the median. Columns (4) to (6) respectively
report the overall, within and between standard deviation of variables.
ln(importit)
5. To control for tariff exemptions we rely on the tariff gap which is defined as the
gap between statutory and effective tariff rates. The latter is the sum of collected tariffs for a
given HS6 code divided by the sum of reported value of imports (Yousefi et al. (2020)).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables. Average reported exports stand
at around 8.1 million USD while average reported imports are 4.1 million USD. There is
significant standard deviation both within and between HS6 codes. The VAT rate also shows
plausible within and between variations due to exemptions and temporal changes in the max
statutory rate. Average statutory tariff is relatively high and stands at 21.3 percent. This
variable has a large between standard deviation and a significant within variation. Average
trade gap is 0.31 which means reported exports to Iran are on average 31 percent more than
reported imports. This is despite the fact that import values are based on CIF prices while
exports are based on FOB. Figure 3 shows the distribution of trade gap for VATable and non-
VATable HS6 codes. Apart from the greater dispersion of the trade gap for VATable goods, the
two distributions are similar. They are slightly right-skewed with more mass on the positive
numbers of the trade gap but they both well extend to the negative numbers. Figure 4 plots
the evolution of the average tariffs for VATable and non-VATable goods. The average tariffs
are smaller for VATable goods but this has been the case from the start of the sample. The
gap widens toward the end of the sample years but seems fairly stable between 2005 to 2014.
5 Method
We use the difference-in-differences (DID) strategy to identify the impact of VAT on the trade
gap. The introduction of VAT in 2008 and the rate increases afterward create quasi-random
variations that allow us to tease out the impact of VAT from tariffs. Figure 5 shows the
5All observations with zero exports or imports are excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 3: Kernel density of the trade gap for VATable and non-VATable goods
Notes: Solid black line shows kernel density estimation of distribution of trade gap for VATable goods. Dashed line
shows a similar distribution for non-VATable goods. We have excluded observations below the first percentile and above
the ninety ninth percentile of trade gap distribution in this plot.
Figure 4: Evolution of average tariff rates for VATable and non-VATable goods
Notes: Solid black line shows average tariff rates for VATable goods in each year. Dashed line shows average tariff rates
for non-VATable goods in each year. The mean rate is the simple mean of tariff rates for HS6 codes available in our data
in each year.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the trade gap for VATable and non-VATable products
Note: Solid black line with solid markers shows average trade gap for VATable goods over the sample years. Dashed
black line with hollow markers shows average trade gap for non-VATable goods. We have excluded observations below
the first percentile and above the ninety ninth percentile of trade gap distribution in this plot. The vertical red line
shows the year of VAT introduction (2008).
evolution of the average trade gap for VATable and non-VATable HS6 codes. The trade gap
for both categories is decreasing prior to 2008, but starts to diverge after 2008. This figure
shows does not control for confounders but still is suggestive of parallel trends prior to VAT
introduction and a divergence between VATable and non-VATable products after VAT. simple
averages which means controlling for confounding factors like simultaneous changes in tariffs
could change the pattern. Next, we discuss several regression specifications that control for
potential confounders to establish causality.
The first regression specification we estimate is as follows:
ln(exportit)− ln(importit) = αi + δt + βVATit + γτ
s




it) + ǫit (1)
here, the dependent variable is trade gap (ln(exportit)− ln(importit)) for product i (HS6) in
year t. VATit is either a dummy variable that equals 1 if commodity i is VATable after 2008, or
the VAT rate for commodity i in year t. The latter variable has more variation and is preferred.




it reflects tariff exemptions, i.e.
the difference between statutory and effective tariff rates. αi and δt indicate HS6 and year
fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β. When VATit is a dummy, β shows the average
percentage change in the trade gap for VATable commodities relative to non-VATable ones
after VAT introduction. Similarly when we use the VAT rate as the explanatory variable, this
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coefficient shows the percentage change in the trade gap in response to a 1 percentage point
increase in the VAT rate.
The identification assumption in (1) is that in the absence of VAT the evolution of the trade gap
for VATable and non-VATable products would be similar. The inclusion of HS6 fixed effects
removes the influence of any time-invariant product characteristics that correlate with the VAT
and the trade gap. For example, the government might have exempted necessities that are
harder to misreport.Year fixed effects control for flexible global trends in the trade gap that are
common to both VATable and non-VATable products. For example, the ICA might have been
implementing enforcement reforms that prevents misreporting. Furthermore, the parallel trend
of the trade gap for VATable and non-VATable products supports our identification (Figure
5). Albeit, all these specifications (e.g., (1)) are vulnerable to events that occur after 2008 and
affect VATable and non-VATable products deferentially.
To study the heterogeneous effect of VAT on products with a short and long value chain, we use
the Broad Economic Classification (BEC). BEC splits HS codes into capital, intermediate, and
consumer goods. Since consumer goods are products that are intended for the final consumer,
they have the shortest value chain. The following specification measures this heterogeneity:
ln(exportit)− ln(importit) = αi + δt + βVATit + ηVATit × 1[cons]i + γτ
s




it) + ǫit (2)
here, 1[cons]i shows whether product i is categorized as a consumer good under BEC. The
omitted category is non-consumer products. Therefore, the coefficient estimate for η reflects
the additional impact of VAT on consumer goods relative to non-consumer ones. η is expected
to be negative if the effect of VAT is stronger for longer value chains. Finally, we look at the
heterogeneity of the VAT effect in HS6 codes with a large initial trade gap by estimating the
following specification:
ln(exportit)− ln(importit) = αi + δt + βVATit + ζVATit × Trade Gap0,i + γτ
s




it) + ǫit (3)
here, Trade Gap0,i reflects the average of the trade gap for HS6 code i during 2005 to 2007
(before VAT introduction). Some products have higher trade evasion during that time period.
The impact of VAT on these products might go either way. Entrenchment of informal links
might be the cause of high initial trade gaps. If these links have no formal downstream
connections, VAT would not be effective in luring them into the formal sector. On the other
hand, a large initial trade gap might reflect better trade evasion opportunities due to product
characteristics or ineffective customs regulations. The imposition of VAT in this case would
result in a stronger effect as VAT enforcement technology would shift large parts of imports
to the formal sector. An alternative interpretation is that products with a small trade gap are
those with a small share of informal importers that are most likely linked with the informal




This section provides the estimation results for the impact of VAT on illegal trade. We first look
at the main results, including the average effect of VAT on the trade gap and its heterogeneity
across consumer and non-consumer products. Then, we conduct several robustness checks to
see the sensitivity of the results.
6.1 Main results
Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates from regressions of the trade gap on VAT and other
covariates. Columns (1) and (2) use the VAT dummy which is equal to one for VATable
products after 2008 and zero otherwise. Column (1) shows that the trade gap for VATable
products decreases by more than 50 percent (significant at 1 percent) after the introduction
of VAT. In column (2), we control for statutory tariffs and tariff exemption and the VAT
dummy coefficient barely changes. This suggests that tariffs are almost independent of VAT.
This was predictable from Figure 4 where VATable and non-VATable products show similar
tariff trends. Columns (3) and (4) use the VAT rate which varies from 0 to 9. These columns
exploit a richer variation by using the introduction and rate changes of VAT. The coefficient
estimate from our preferred specification in column (4) suggests that a 1 percentage point
increase in the VAT rate results in a reduction of 6.7 percent in the trade gap6. The effect of
the VAT rate is the opposite of statutory tariffs. A one percentage point increase in statutory
tariffs increases the trade gap by 2.6 percent. This means that a uniform one percentage
point reduction in tariffs combined with a one percentage point increase in VAT has a double
dividend in reducing the trade gap. The combined effect is 9.3 percent with VAT playing the
main role in reducing the trade gap.
Table 3 looks at the heterogeneity of the VAT impact across different product categories.
Columns (1) and (5) report coefficient estimates from columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 for
comparison. Again we report estimates from the VAT dummy and the VAT rate regressions.
We only discuss the results for the VAT rate regressions. Column (6) adds in the interaction
of the VAT rate with the consumer product dummy. Those products experience a smaller
decrease in the trade gap compared to other products. A one percentage point increase in
the VAT rate results in a reduction of 2.6 and 7.4 percent respectively for consumer and non-
consumer products (both coefficients are significant). This confirms the earlier conjecture that
products with a longer value chain receive a larger impact from the VAT implementation.
Column (7) of Table 3 looks at the role of initial trade gap in mediating the effect of VAT.
The negative coefficient estimate suggests that products with a larger initial trade gap receive
6Since the VAT rate increased from 0 to 9 percent, this coefficient suggests a total effect of 60 percent which
is in line with the coefficient estimate from the VAT dummy.
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Table 2: Regression results for the impact of VAT on the trade Gap
Dep. var: Trade Gap VAT Dummy VAT rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VAT -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.066*** -0.067***
0.091 0.1 0.011 0.013
τs 0.026*** 0.026***
0.002 0.002
τs − τe -0.017*** -0.018***
0.0019 0.0019
Obs. 40674 36891 40674 36891
R
2
0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors from four regressions. In all regressions the dependent
variable is trade gap (difference between log of exports to Iran reported by WITS and log of imports reported by ICA).
Columns (1) and (2) include a VAT dummy that is equal to 1 for VATable goods after 2008. Columns (3) and (4) include
the VAT rate in the regression instead. τs is the statutory tariff rate. τs−τe is tariff exemption defined as the difference
between the statutory and effective tariff rates. All regressions include constant variable, HS6 and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at HS4 level and are reported in parenthesis below coefficients. There are
1125 clusters. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively show significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
a stronger impact from VAT. A 100 percent increase in the initial trade gap intensifies the
impact of VAT on the trade gap by 7.3 percentage points. Evaluated at the mean of initial
trade gap (52 percent), the estimated impact of VAT on the trade gap is 6.3 percent which is
close to the average effect in column (5). Including the two interactions in a single specification
does not change the pattern of results (column (8)). An important point emerges from this
specification. After controlling for the initial trade gap, the impact of VAT on the trade gap of
consumer products is positive (+5.4 percent). Consumer products have a higher initial trade
gap and therefore, the estimated coefficient in column (6) has a downward bias because two
opposing mechanisms are lumped together. Higher initial trade gap increases the impact of
VAT on the trade gap, but a shorter value chain works in the opposite direction. Overall, these
patterns are in line with the idea that the VAT chain effects are very important in bringing
the informal traders into the formal sector.
In order to investigate the time profile of the VAT effect, we estimate the following specification
ln(exportit)− ln(importit) = αi +Σ
2016






it) + ǫit. (4)
This specification is identical to the main specification except for a complete set of interaction
term. VATi is a dummy variable that is equal to one for VATable HS6 products across all
years of the sample. T [t = s]t is a dummy variable that is equal to one if we are in year s
and zero otherwise. The coefficient estimates for the interaction terms show the differential
evolution of VATable products relative to non-VATable ones in each year relative to the base
year (2005). Figure 6 plots the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from
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Table 3: The heterogeneity of the impact of VAT on the trade Gap
Dep. var: Trade
Gap
VAT Dummy VAT rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VAT -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.13 -0.20** -0.067*** -0.074*** -0.026** -0.038***
0.1 0.1 0.097 0.097 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012
VAT × 1[cons] 0.12 0.55*** 0.048*** 0.092***
0.14 0.1 0.017 0.014
VAT × Trade Gap
0
-0.69*** -0.71*** -0.073*** -0.075***
0.022 0.022 0.0026 0.0026
Observations 36891 36891 35126 35126 36891 36891 35126 35126
R
2
0.46 0.46 0.5 0.5 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors from 10 regressions. All regressions include τs (statutory
tariff rate), τs − τe (tariff exemption) , and HS6 and year fixed effects. For the columns including factors interactions,
the factors are controlled (but not reported). Standard errors are corrected for clustering at HS4 level and are reported
in parenthesis below coefficients. There are 1125 clusters. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively show significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent level.
(4). The coefficients are not statistically different from zero in 2006 and 2007 suggesting
that the difference in trade gap of VATable and non-VATable products is stable prior to the
introduction of VAT. The difference between the two product categories emerges right in 2008
and remains stable afterward. This result alleviates concerns regarding the parallel trends
assumption.
6.2 Robustness regressions
In order to check the robustness of the results we conduct three tests. First, during 2012
and 2013 the tightening of the economic sanctions resulted in a recession and a significant
exchange rate depreciation. Year fixed effects would absorb the effect of sanctions as far as
they are uniform across VATable and non-VATable products. However, it might be that the
luxury products, which are VATable, are hit harder by the UN sanctions in 2012. To see
the sensitivity of our results to this event, we exclude 2012 and 2013 from the sample and
re-estimate the coefficients. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4 show the results for this sample
restriction. Coefficient estimates and their significance barely change.
Second, as discussed in section 3, the VAT law implementation phased in through the issuance
of 6 notices by Iran National Tax Administration. These notices applied to domestic firms;
notably, the importers were required to register for the VAT from the beginning. Even though
this is unlikely to affect imports, it might weaken the chain effects. To address this issue, we
exclude 2008 to 2014 (phase-in years) and estimate coefficients with the remaining years in
columns (5) to (8) of Table 4. This is a stringent test as we are left with 5 years. However, the
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Figure 6: Evolution of the difference in trade Gap by VATable and Non-VATable products
Notes: Figure shows coefficient estimates and 95 percent clustered confidence interval from a regression of trade gap on a
full set of year interactions with VATable dummy, statutory tariff rate, tariff gap, HS6 and year fixed effects (specification
(4)). The vertical line shows the year 2008 when the VAT was introduced.
new results are stronger and patterns do not change. The heterogeneity of the results remains
the same as well; products with a shorter value chain and an initially smaller trade gap receive
a smaller impact from the VAT.
Third, trade gap might be mean reverting in the sense that when trade gap is high it tends
to follow a declining trend. This threat is particularly important for us because the VAT
rate increases almost linearly after 2008. In other words, any trends in trade gap might be
confounded with the effect of the VAT rate increases because the variation in the latter is
simply uniform over the years. We conduct two robustness checks to alleviate mean reversion
concerns. First, we drop observations with outlier trade gap which are more likely to be
far from the mean . The results from this regression is shown in column (1) of Table 5.
Coefficient estimates and their significance is unchanged7. Second, we allow the trade gap to
have a heterogeneous linear trend with respect to initial trade gap. Column (2) shows the
coefficient estimates from this specification. Coefficient estimates for the VAT rate and its
interaction with consumption dummy are similar to the main results. However, the coefficient
estimate for the interaction of VAT and trade gap changes sign and becomes smaller. This
change is due to the fact that we do not have a rich variation in the VAT rate. Therefore, it
is virtually impossible to interpret this coefficient estimate once we include the interaction of
the linear trend with initial trade gap. The two other coefficients are, however, robust even to
quadratic and cubic trends (columns (3) and (4)).
7The pattern of results are also robust to stricter exclusion of extreme observations.
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Table 4: Robustness of the impact of VAT on the trade gap to exclusion of specific years
Dep. var: Trade
Gap
Excl. 2012-13 Excl. 2008-14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VAT rate -0.066*** -0.071*** -0.026** -0.036*** -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.032** -0.041***
0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014
VAT × 1[cons] 0.037** 0.080*** 0.023 0.072***
0.016 0.014 0.019 0.014
VAT × Trade Gap0 -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.084*** -0.086***
0.0027 0.0026 0.0027 0.0027
Observations 31006 31006 29607 29607 15753 15753 15160 15160
R
2
0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.4 0.4 0.45 0.45
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors from 10 regressions. All regressions include τs (statutory
tariff rate), τs − τe (tariff exemption) , and HS6 and year fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at
HS4 level and are reported in parenthesis below coefficients. There are 1125 clusters. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively show
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Table 5: Robustness of the impact of VAT on the trade gap
Dep. var: Trade Gap Gap∈ [p5, p95] Mean reversion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VAT rate -0.033*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041***
0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012
VAT × 1[cons] 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091***
0.012 0.014 0.014 0.014
VAT × Trade Gap0 -0.061*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
0.0025 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049
Linear Trend ×Trade Gap0 Y Y Y
Quadratic Trend ×Trade Gap0 Y Y
Cubic Trend ×Trade Gap0 Y
Observations 20777 35126 35126 35126
R
2
0.48 0.5 0.5 0.5
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors from 4 regressions. All regressions include τs (statutory
tariff rate), τs − τe (tariff exemption) , and HS6 and year fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at
HS4 level and are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficients. There are 1125 clusters. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively
show significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Table 6: Placebo test of the impact of VAT on the trade gap
Dep. var: Trade Gap All products non-VATable products VATable products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT -0.013 -0.022 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(0.018) (0.020) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
VAT × 1[cons] 0.071 0.021 0.035***
(0.079) (0.022) (0.012)
Observations 36,891 36,891 8,957 8,957 27,934 27,934
R
2
0.457 0.457 0.517 0.517 0.428 0.428
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors from 6 regressions. In columns (1) and (2), the VAT
dummy is assigned randomly for 56% of observations. This date of the VAT introduction is still assumed to be 2008.
In columns (3) and (4), we keep non-VATable products and randomly assign half of them the actual VAT rate in the
given year. In columns (5) and (6), we keep VATable products and randomly assign the VAT rate to zero for half of
them. Again the date of reform is assumed to be 2008. All regressions include τs (statutory tariff rate), τs − τe (tariff
exemption) , and HS6 and year fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at HS4 level and are reported
in parenthesis below coefficients. There are 1125 clusters. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively show significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent level.
We also conduct three placebo regressions to further validate the results (Table 6). First, we
randomly assign a VAT dummy to 56 percent of HS6 products irrespective of whether they
are actually VATable or not. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show no
significant result. Second, we keep non-VATable HS6 codes and again randomly assign half
of them to be VATable. As the results in columns (3) and (4) show we still do not pick up
any significant effect. Finally, we keep VATable products and randomly assign half of them to
be non-VATable. Here the only significant effect is the interaction of VAT and consumption
dummy. This is to be expected because in all placebo tests we keep the reform date to be
2008 and we do not randomize the assignment to consumer products. Therefore, post 2008,
consumer products among VATable products show an expansion in their trade gap.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we identify a novel interaction between VAT and tariffs. We find that the
introduction of the VAT significantly reduces the trade evasion. In our preferred specification,
a one percentage point increase in the VAT rate reduces the trade gap by 6.7 percent. Three
points are worth emphasizing. First, the introduction of VAT has complementary effects on
other tax bases. In our context, the backward linkages activated by the VAT incentivize
importers to truthfully reveal their imports. The fact that consumer products with a shorter
value chain are less affected by the introduction of VAT further confirms this hypothesis. This
channel could be extended to other types of taxes, including the corporate tax. VATable firms
would require VAT invoices for purchases and sales. These receipts are available from other
trading partners as well (paper trail). Therefore, it becomes harder to evade on the corporate
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tax. Such inter-tax base mechanisms are yet to be studied in the empirical literature. Second,
the magnitude of the VAT effect on the trade gap is 2.5 times that of the tariff rate. The trade
evasion literature has largely focused on tariffs (Fisman and Wei (2004)) or other product
characteristics (Javorcik and Narciso (2008); Mishra et al. (2008)). Our finding shows that
the overall enforcement environment including the existence of efficient tax instruments such
as the VAT could create large spillovers. Third, we add support for a joint tariff VAT reform
by shedding light on the complementarity between VAT and tariffs which has not been studied
in the literature (Emran and Stiglitz (2007, 2005); Baunsgaard and Keen (2010); Keen and
Ligthart (2002); Keen (2008)). Our findings suggest a double dividend from replacing tariffs
by VAT. Tax revenue increases by reduced imports misreporting and by a broader VAT base.
VAT is an effective tax instrument because it creates opposite evasion incentives for the two
sides of a transaction, leaves a paper trail, and withholds taxes at the upstream (Waseem
(2020b); Keen and Lockwood (2010)). Such properties are operative at the point of imports
as well because this is the first point that VAT is levied for production chains that rely
on imported commodities (Keen (2008)). Therefore, VAT creates an incentive for honest
reporting of imports. In the presence of VAT, import tax evasion affects both the importers
(risk of getting caught) and the downstream firms. If downstream firms have some exposure
to the formal sector, e.g. through VAT registration or corporate taxes, they would need valid
VAT receipts. This backward pressure creates incentives for honest reporting of imports.
Theoretically speaking, VAT may push firms into either formal or informal sectors, depending
on how large is the informal sector (De Paula and Scheinkman (2010, 2011)). The larger the
informal sector, the higher the likelihood of pushing firms into the informal sector. However,
many empirical studies suggest that the overall effect is in favor of the formal sector (Pomeranz
(2015); Carrillo et al. (2017)). Our findings adds support to the effectiveness of VAT in a middle
country with pervasive tax evasion.
Our study faces two limitations. First, the variation in the VAT rate is close to linear. There-
fore, we do not have enough statistical power to control for product-level differential trends.
Had the VAT rate been reduced or increased dramatically in our context, we would have had
stronger identification to support our findings. While, we have conducted several robustness
tests and showed similar pre-trends, our results might still suffer from non-VAT related dif-
ferential trends that are specific to VAT products. Second, we do not observe tax revenue
(for the VAT and tariffs). Therefore, we cannot show the impacts on the final variable of
interest. Here, aggregate figures support the idea that the tax revenue has gone up after VAT
introduction but the evidence is far from convincing.
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